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Abstract
The conventional explanation for strikes is that they are caused by an asymmetry of
information about the protability of the rm union members are uninformed whereas
management are informed. Instead, this paper builds a model of strikes where a percep-
tion of unfairness provides an expressive benet to vote for a strike. The asymmetry of
information is now reversed such that management are uninformed about the emotionality
of union members. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage o¤ers
and the incidence of strikes. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the
predictions. In particular, union size is positively correlated with the incidence of strikes
and other industrial actions, even when asymmetric information regarding protability is
controlled for.
JEL Classication: D03; D72; J52
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There is a general consensus in the literature on strikes that they are caused by asymmetric
information. The union overestimates the protability of their employers and demands too
high a wage. This leads to a strike, which lasts until the union settles for a lower wage. The
strike serves an economic function because if the union were never to strike, the employer
would always o¤er the lowest possible wage. This consensus view is reected in the dictionary
review of the topic by Kennan (2008), and it is also the prevailing explanation given in the
brief textbook discussion by Borjas (2006) and the survey by Cramton and Tracy (2002).
The literature that these surveys refer to tends to be much older and started to fade in the
early 1990s (key references are Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Kennan, 1986; Card, 1990).
Two reasons could be posited for the decline in interest in strikes. First, they are rare events
and have become increasingly rare from the 1990s onwards.1 Second, asymmetric information
seemed to provide the clearest answer to the Hicks paradox (i.e., the paradox of ine¢ cient lost
surplus) so that the theoretical debate appeared settled. The work on the origins of strikes
can also be tied to more general work on the causes of conict. Fearon (1995) famously argued
that (if we ignore irrationality) there are only three factors which can bring about ine¢ cient
conict: commitment problems, indivisibilities, and asymmetric information. The rst two
potential explanations are not really plausible as features of strikes, which leaves asymmetric
information as an explanation.
This paper takes a fresh look at strikes theoretically and empirically by incorporating
developments in behavioural and political economics that have taken place since the 1990s.
These developments are the theory of expressive choice in political economics, and the theory
of fairness within behavioural economics. We believe that the literature on strikes was dying
before the emergence of these theories, and that it is now time to revisit strikes in the light
that they provide. These concepts broaden the traditional, narrow view of rationality and
thus could be viewed as rationalising a possible fourth explanation for conict given by Fearon,
namely irrationality. We still argue that asymmetric information is crucial in causing strikes,
but in a very di¤erent way to the standard explanation: in our approach, the employer is not
fully informed about the level of emotionality or expressiveness among union members.
Expressive voting acknowledges the fact that when voting in elections (and a union ballot
is, of course, in e¤ect an election), the probability of being decisive in determining the outcome
is less than one, and as the size of the electorate becomes larger the probability of being
decisive approaches zero. This matters because it may undermine the standard idea that
union members vote purely out of indirect instrumental interest. Union members may in fact
receive a greater direct expressive benet of voting for a strike. This direct expressive benet
1See e.g., Simms and Charlwood (2010) on unions and industrial action in the UK, and Bennett and
Kaufman (2007) for the United States.
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can outweigh the potentially signicant costs of strikes occurring, because these costs are
discounted by the very low probability of being decisive in determining the outcome.2 The
link between expressiveness and strikes was recognised by Glazer (1992) in a paper that clearly
inuences the analysis conducted here. He argued that if union members are emotional, they
may vote for a strike on emotional grounds, even though they would not have done so if they
were choosing purely instrumentally. They are free to choose emotionally because their vote
is highly unlikely to determine the outcome of a ballot.
While Glazer bases his expressive theory of voting for strikes on emotional payo¤s, he
does not provide a formal foundation for them. The analysis presented here aims to do that
by tying the emotional payo¤ from voting for a strike to the theory of fairness developed by
Rabin (1993).3 In Rabins theory, as long as the costs are not too high, individuals will be
willing to hurt individuals that hurt them or, more positively, make sacrices for individuals
that make sacrices for them. This can explain cooperation in a one-shot prisonersdilemma,
but also, from a negative welfare perspective, the failure to coordinate in the Battle of the
Sexes.
A key feature of Rabins theory is that the stakes must be low. As soon as they become
high, psychologicalpayo¤s will be swamped by material payo¤s and the standard predictions
would apply. Decisions made by voting (or collective action more generally) turn high material
stakes into low material stakes. Therefore, it could be that a collective decision leads to
a highly ine¢ cient decision being made (for example a strike) because ex ante the union
members correctly perceive that their probability of determining the outcome of the election
is very small. Thus, for each individual union member the decision in the ballot concerns low
material stakes, although ex post the material stakes may be extremely high in terms of lost
income and other e¤ects. The material stakes ex ante will become smaller the larger the size
of the union, as this further reduces the probability of being decisive, and fairness concerns
will play a larger relative role in the calculus of voting.4
2The literature on expressive voting spans several decades and is both theoretically and empirically rich.
An early and inuential contribution was made by Tullock (1971) and his depiction of the charity of the
uncharitablewhere voters choose higher levels of redistribution because they are not decisive in determining
the outcome. Kliemt (1986) described expressive choice as a veil of insignicance. The signicance for
democratic decision-making was given a detailed examination in Brennan and Lomasky (1994). For a discussion
and comprehensive survey of the expressive choice literature, see Hamlin and Jennings (2011). Hillman (2010)
identies the possibility of expressive policy traps where individuals expressively choose policies that make
them worse o¤ which they would not have chosen were they decisive. In the analysis presented here, strikes
occur because of expressive choice by union members, and as they are ine¢ cient choices, union members could
be viewed as having fallen for an expressive trap.
3Godard (1992) informally also makes the point that strikes can be due to perceptions of unfairness.
4 It should be noted that there are multiple possible sources of expressive benet dependent on the context in
which expressiveness might operate. The survey of expressive choice in Hamlin and Jennings (2011) emphasises
this. Here we pick out one potential source, perception of unfairness, as we believe it is is especially relevant
in the context of strikes.
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In our theoretical model combining fairness concerns (following Rabin) and expressiveness,
we demonstrate how fairness concerns are incorporated into two-person employer/employee
bargaining over a wage. We see that the equilibrium wage will be higher than if the fairness
concerns were absent. That is, the employee would be willing to hurt him or herself to hurt
the employer through a strike, but only if the wage o¤ered by the employer is close to the
employees reservation wage. At higher wage o¤ers, although the employee may nd the o¤er
unfair, the costs of striking are too high and a strike will therefore not occur. We then extend
the analysis to group voting on whether to strike or not. As the union size becomes larger
and psychological payo¤s receive greater weight relative to material payo¤s, the model makes
two predictions. First, wages will grow with union size. Second, strikes are more likely with
increasing union size.
As stated earlier, in this model asymmetric information still lies at the heart of the expla-
nation for strikes, but it now acts in the opposite direction: from the employer towards the
employees. If the employer had full knowledge about the exact level of emotionality within
the union, she would set the wage at the lowest level that would avoid a strike. However, she
is not likely to have this knowledge, and as a result may underestimate emotionality and o¤er
a wage which is too low, such that union members vote for strike action. This can happen
even though there is no asymmetric information regarding the protability of the rm, as is
the case for example for publicly listed companies.
We provide supporting evidence for our two theoretical predictions using UK data gathered
in the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry,
2005a). We nd that even when controlling for "classical" asymmetric information regarding
protability, union size is positively and signicantly associated with higher average wages in
a rm and increased industrial action incidence. While the former result could arguably also
be explained by the e¤ects of union (bargaining) power due to increased size,5 the latter is a
novel nding. There is no theoretical reason to believe that increased bargaining power i.e.,
increased union size in itself should lead to more industrial actions once we have taken the
conventional asymmetric-information hypothesis into account. We therefore believe that our
nding strongly suggests that expressive behaviour can help us understand the occurrence of
strikes and other types of industrial action.
As mentioned above, strikes and industrial actions in general are relatively rare events.
However, it does not follow that the analysis of their origins has become irrelevant: when
strikes happen, they are often very big news. In recent times there have been very high prole
strikes such as the British Airways (BA) dispute between 2009 and 2011 and the Chicago
Teacher Union dispute in 2012. In cases such as these, it is hard to see how the conventional
explanation for strikes holds as the protability of BA and the size of the Chicago city budget
5See e.g., Simms and Charlwood (2010), who also o¤er a critique of the use of union size as an e¤ective
measure of union power.
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were common knowledge. Anecdotal evidence provided by the news coverage suggests that
these were disputes driven by high emotions. The model presented here provides a rationale for
strikes based on emotions, where the standard explanation based on asymmetric information
regarding protability is absent.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its main
predictions; Section 3 describes the data, methodology and results from the empirical analysis;
and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider a rm and union that undergo negotiations over a union wage. We simplify
the analysis by assuming the rm to be of a xed size in terms of the number of workers and
its revenue is xed at p per worker. The employers prots are given by p   w per worker
where w is the wage paid out to each worker. The negotiation over a wage o¤er involves a rm
selecting a wage within the interval w 2 [0; p], which a subset of the workers who are members
of the union decide to either accept or reject through a vote to (not) strike. If a strike does
not occur, payo¤s are w and p w, for each worker and the rm, respectively. In the event of
a strike, payo¤s for all actors are normalised to zero. While we hold the size of the workforce
to be xed, we allow the number of workers that are unionised to be variable. As union size
becomes larger, the probability of any single union member determining whether there is a
strike or not becomes smaller. This would increase the weight on expressive concerns relative
to instrumental concerns, provided that expressive concerns exist. The extent to which union
members are expressive is known to the members, but is not known to the employer. Union
members will, in general, interact with each other to a much greater extent than they will with
management. In addition, we will see that it would be in the interest of union members to
try and convince management that they are extreme in their expressiveness. For this reason,
management would be unlikely to trust signals of expressiveness that they receive from union
members.
The model presented in this section advances the work by Glazer (1992) in a major way by
being precise about the content of an expressive choice. We do this by grounding it in Rabins
(1993) theory of fairness. As an application in his paper, Rabin discusses the extent to which
concerns with fairness prevent a monopolist from being able to extract the full surplus from
the consumer. Above a certain price, the consumer would prefer to punish the monopolist
(and herself) by not purchasing a good that would have generated positive material benets,
both for the consumer and the monopolist. We adapt this application to the setting of wage
negotiations between an employer and a union.
We show how the inclusion of concerns about fairness a¤ects wage determination in nego-
tiations between an employer and the union, such that wage demands are higher than if there
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were no concern for fairness, and that the employer will agree to these higher demands. We
then introduce expressiveness and demonstrate that this may amplify the concern for fairness,
which in turn further increases wage demands. If the employer cannot perfectly predict the
expressiveness of the union members, she may underestimate its realised value and o¤er too
low a wage and thus cause a strike, which arises out of a sense of unfairness. When union
size is small and wage demands are small, the rm is more likely to set the wage at the level
demanded by potentially highly expressive union members, thus avoiding the possibility of a
strike. As union size becomes larger and wage demands rise, the employer is likely to set the
wage at a level that would be demanded by a more moderately expressive union. In doing
so, however, the employer is more likely to incur a strike. The model gives two main predic-
tions that can be tested empirically. First, as union size increases the average wage increases.
Second, as union size increases the probability of a strike increases.
2.1 A theory of fairness
We rst summarise the Rabin approach to modelling fairness.6 From a material two-player
game, a psychological game is derived which will determine each players psychological utility.
This will depend on three factors. The unions strategy (au) depends on her belief about
the strategy of the employers (be) ; and her belief about the employers belief regarding her
strategy (cu) . A similar description applies to the employer.
We derive a kindness function for the union, fu (au; be) and the unions perception of the
employers kindness efe (be; cu). These are expressed as follows
fu (au; be) =
e (au; be)  faire (be)
maxe (be)  mine (be)
(1)
and efe (be; cu) = u (cu; be)  fairu (cu)
maxu (cu)  minu (cu)
(2)
where e (au; be) is the payo¤ received by the employer given that he chooses strategy be and
the union chooses strategy au. 
fair
e (be) is dened as
[he (be)+le(be)]
2 and refers to the mid-point
between the highest and lowest (Pareto e¢ cient) payo¤s the union could give to the employer
given that the employer plays strategy be: If the numerator is positive, the union is being
kind to the employer. If it is negative, the union is being unkind, and if it is zero the unions
behaviour is neutral in terms of kindness. The function fu is weighted by the maximum payo¤
the union could give the employer, minus the lowest possible payo¤ (now including possibly
6Other well-known models of fairness are presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). These are less preferable to use
as a basis for the approach presented here because the main concern of the participants in this paper is with
the intentions of the other group rather than equality, and modelling the game as simultaneous rather than
sequential makes it considerably more tractable without any loss in essential insight.
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Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤s) that the union could give the employer given their choice of be.
A Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤ obviously means playing a strategy that will make both parties
worse o¤ compared to an alternative available strategy open to the union. The function ffe is
analogous to fu and measures the unions perception of the employers kindness towards her,
given her belief that the employer believes she is playing strategy cu. Analogous functions fe
and ffu are derived in the same way for the employer. It will become clear below how these
payo¤s are depicted for the game we are analysing.
The following utility function for the union is assumed, which incorporates material and
psychological payo¤s
Uu (au; be; cu) = u (au; be) + efe (be; cu) [1 + fu (au; be)] (3)
and similarly for Ue (ae; bu; ce). u refers to the material payo¤ and efe [1 + fu] refers to the
psychological payo¤. We can see from the psychological payo¤ that if the union believes
that the employer is unkind
efe < 0, then the psychological payo¤ would be maximised by
choosing to be unkind towards the employer (fu < 0). The reverse is true if the employer
is perceived as being kind. If the employer is perceived as being neutral
efe = 0 then
the psychological payo¤ is irrelevant. Note though that the possibility of the psychological
payo¤ altering behaviour is dependent upon the material payo¤ being relatively small. A
contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how a high-stakes material game such as a strike
can be converted into a game in which these stakes are reduced and psychological payo¤s can
change behaviour.
2.2 Equilibrium without psychological payo¤s
We now apply the Rabin model to a setting of wage negotiations between an employer and
a union. Assume initially that the union is represented by only one member so that he or
she is completely decisive in negotiations with the employer and there is no expressiveness.
The employer picks w 2 [0; p] and the union representative simultaneously picks r 2 [0; p] : If
r > w then there is a strike and the payo¤ is zero for both parties. If r  w the payo¤s are w
and p w for the workers and rm, respectively. First, let us consider what would happen in a
world without fairness concerns where workers and employers are purely materially motivated.
Although any wage between 0 and p is a Nash equilibrium, elimination of weakly dominated
strategies means that w = 0 is the predicted outcome of the game. To see this, note that since
the wage is determined by the o¤er made by the employer (so long as it is greater than or equal
to the wage requested by the union) then a best response to any o¤er by the employer is for
the union to ask for r = 0. Any request for r > 0 may mean demanding a wage greater than
the employer o¤ers, thus resulting in a payo¤ of zero; whereas if r = 0 had been requested,
the union members would have received the o¤er of w made by the employer. Depicting
the employer as having the power to set the wage goes against the standard approach to
7
modelling wage setting with a union, where the opposite is frequently assumed and the union
is depicted as having the power to set the wage subject to their concerns about the trade-o¤
with employment. We take this approach so that we can isolate the e¤ect of fairness concerns
and expressive logic from other possible sources of union bargaining power.
2.3 Fairness equilibrium
We assume that non-union members are also bound by the wage negotiated by the union and
employer. If a strike is called, non-union members would not be able to work. What is the
lowest wage consistent with a fairness equilibrium? Given the employer sets w, she can get
p   w or 0. If r  w then the union representative maximises both his and the employers
payo¤, and from (1) we can see that fu = 0. By choosing any r  w the employer receives a
payo¤ of p w: Thus there is only one e¢ cient payo¤ for the employer, namely p w. If r > w
then the union representative minimises the payo¤ of both parties to zero (thus choosing a
Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤, given that an e¢ cient payo¤ would have been available if r  w
had been chosen), so fu =  1. The employer will never feel positively towards the employee,
because even if the union asks for a wage lower than the one that the rm o¤ers, they will
still receive w and thus all o¤ers of r  w are in the material interest of the union as well as
the employer. For this reason the employer will never o¤er w > r. So in a fairness equilibrium
w = r. Would the union representative wish to deviate and choose r > w ? If so,
Uu = 0 + efe [1  1] = 0; (4)
and by choosing r = w
Uu = w + efe [1 + 0] : (5)
To solve we need rst to solve for efe (how kind the rm is perceived to be by the worker, from






efe is clearly negative because the employer o¤ers the lowest possible wage that she can that





This is the lowest wage the rm could o¤er that would avoid a strike. Clearly the wage in the
fairness equilibrium is higher than in the Nash equilibrium, reecting the concern for fairness.
Note though that in this limited case where we assume only one union representative, so that
she is completely decisive when determining whether there is a strike or not, the wage agreed
is still very small as a proportion of p, as p becomes large. This makes sense: it tells us that
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when revenues are very high, an individual representative would nd it too costly materially
to ght for the same share of the revenue as when revenues are low.
We now extend the analysis to a ballot of union members where the number of union
members balloted is greater than one.7 An immediate implication of a collective ballot is
that a single individual will not be decisive in determining the outcome. As the number of
union members balloted increases, the probability of being decisive becomes smaller.8 In this
environment, if expressive preferences exist, their e¤ect will be magnied the larger the union
and thus the lower the probability of being decisive. We include expressiveness as being driven
by the psychological payo¤ in such a way that union members experience a psychological payo¤
from their decision, even if that decision is not the one that is reached by the union overall.
In other words, they may receive direct expressive utility from their choice, as well as indirect
instrumental utility from the outcome. Assume there is a vote on whether to strike or not.
We assume that each members expressiveness is given by a parameter  2 [0; 1]. When  = 0
the members are not expressive, but purely instrumental in their outlook towards any wage
o¤er. In this case, for an individual to obtain utility from choosing to hurt the employer, the
employer must actually be hurt. In contrast, at the extreme  = 1, the members are fully
expressive. In this case, a member will receive utility from their choice to hurt the employer
even if the employer is not actually hurt.
Let us denote w0 as the wage o¤er proposed by the rm. The individual worker has
to decide whether to vote yes or no for a strike. Given the union members level of
expressiveness, , the expected payo¤ for the member if she votes for a strike, is given by
S  0 + Nw0 + D  0| {z }
Material payo¤s







+ N  0| {z }
psychological payo¤s
(8)
where S and N are the probabilities of a strike occurring and not occurring, respectively,
and D is the probability of being decisive in the voting decision, N + S + D = 1: Note
that for tractability, D is presented as exogenous. The reality of collective action is that as
group size increases, the probability of being decisive decreases. This is what is depicted here.
The rst component illustrates the material payo¤s the individual will gain: it is only
positive for the case where a strike does not occur and the worker receives w0. The second
component captures the psychological payo¤s and is subject to the level of expressiveness.
If  = 0 the union member fully absorbs the psychological payo¤ associated with the group
decision. In this case expressiveness is not present. In the event that the union decides not
to strike, the member receives the psychological utility associated with that decision even






7The reader should not interpret the ballot too literally. The analysis we present could apply to any sort of
collective action in which a threshold level of support is required to induce action.
8On the probability of being decisive, see Gelman, Silver and Edlin (2012).
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with choosing not to retaliate to the perceived unkindness of the employer. If  = 1 the union
member receives the psychological payo¤ associated with his own decision even in the event
that it does not actually come about. This means that the member enjoys the psychological
benet (a zero payo¤ as opposed to w
0 p
2p ) of retaliating to perceived unkindness on the part
of the employer by choosing to strike, even though the union decides not to strike. This is an
expressive payo¤ because it is a choice that generates a payo¤ that is unrelated to the actual








When a union member decides to vote against a strike, her expected payo¤ is given by:
S  0 + Nw0 + Dw0 + S  0(1  ) + w
0   p
2p
(S + D + N ) ; (10)








(S + D + N ) : (11)
A member will be indi¤erent between voting yesand no, when the expected payo¤s from
(9) and (11) are equal. Combining (9) and (11), using that N + S + D = 1, and solving
for the fairnesswage o¤er w0, we obtain
w0 =
p ((1  D) + D)
2pD + (1  D) + D : (12)
We can see that
p ((1  D) + D)




if  > 0 and D < 1. This means that if there is expressiveness ( > 0) due to the decision
being made by a group, the wage claim is higher because the union members need not be
as concerned that their decision to vote for a strike will actually determine whether a strike
occurs or not.9
From above, (12) shows the minimum wage o¤er union members will accept from the
rm. Note that this depends on the probability of being decisive as well as on the level of
expressiveness. In particular, it is straightforward to show:
9Note that if  = 0 or D = 1, the wage is the same as when we analysed the case for one union member.
The model could thus have been presented with multiple workers from the beginning. However, we believe it is
more insightful to start with the special case of one union member because the standard approach to modelling
wage negotiations between employers and unions implicitly assumes that the union is a single agent rather
than a collective of agents. The approach we take helps us to more sharply illuminate that distinction in the






(D + 2pD + (1  D))2
> 0: (13)
As expressiveness increases, then so too does the minimum level of wage o¤er that the union





(2pD + (1  D) + D)2
> 0; (14)
which is positive because the change in the probability of being decisive with respect to the
number of union members dDdn is decreasing.
These simple ndings provide the framework for one of our testable predictions: increased
union size leads to higher wages. This argument is not based on the idea that increased union
size means that the union is stronger; rather, we identify a di¤erent process such that the
role of expressive preferences is enhanced in a strike ballot. We make one other key empirical
prediction, based on the theoretical ndings: larger union size leads to more strikes.
If expressiveness were known not to exist, so that  = 0, then w0 = p2p+1 and there will
never be a strike regardless of union size. For strikes to exist, expressiveness must exist, and
there must be uncertainty on the part of the employer as to the value of : Again, note that the
asymmetric information (management uncertainty regarding expressiveness) presented here
predicts the possibility of strikes which could not exist according to the conventional model
of asymmetric information (union uncertainty over prots). When D = 1 such that there
is only one union member,  is irrelevant to the wage o¤er, which is again w0 = p2p+1 , and
there will never be a strike. As the union size becomes larger and D becomes smaller, w0
increases so long as  > 0. If all values of  are assumed possible, the only way to prevent












If the employer were to set the wage at a value of  such that  < 1 and this wage o¤er were
acceptable to the union, the realised prots per worker would be higher:
2p2D





for 0 <  < 1 and 0 < D < 1:
The issue then is whether the higher prot per worker in the event that there is no strike
compensates for the risk that the realisation of  is higher than
_
 and the incurrence of zero
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prots as a result, that is
pr
 
   2p2D












This can be rewritten as follows
pr
 
     > D  2p  1  pr    +  1   : (19)
For (19) to hold, pr
 
   > . This will not hold for a distribution of  that is uniform,
but it would be the case for a distribution which is normal (supposing that  is set at a
relatively high level), for example. It is also more likely to hold the smaller is D (the larger
the union membership). Assuming that (19) holds, if we di¤erentiate the net expected prot















As union membership increases and D approaches zero, this expression is more likely to
be negative since 0 <
dpr()
d
< 1. This implies that higher expected prot per worker will
be generated if  is reduced. Clearly this increases the probability of a strike occurring.
3 Empirical analysis
Below we provide supportive evidence for the two main points from the theoretical model.
First, we test whether larger unions are correlated with higher average wages (Question 1);
and second, whether greater union size is correlated with more industrial actions (Question
2). We begin by briey describing the survey dataset and the main variables, and then discuss
our methodology and present the results.
3.1 The workplace employee relations survey
The dataset used in our analysis is based on the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004
(WERS2004), collected by the Department of Trade and Industry (2005a) in Great Britain.
This is a large, nationally representative sample survey of workplaces with ve or more em-
ployees. The WERS2004 is the fth in a series of surveys, and the rst to include rms with
less than ten employees (the 1998 survey included rms with ten or more employees, while the
previous surveys only included rms with at least 25 employees). The rm size distribution
in Great Britain is highly skewed towards smaller-sized establishments: in order to ensure a
su¢ cient number of rms in each size category for potential analysis by rm size, larger rms
were therefore over-sampled. In addition, the sample was stratied by Standard Industrial
Classication 2003 (SIC, 2003), where Sections A to C (Agriculture, hunting and forestry;
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Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying), P (Private households with employed persons) and Q
(Extra territorial bodies), as well as Northern Irish rms were excluded. The Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) provides researchers with appropriate weights in order to ensure
unbiased estimations when using the WERS dataset.
The WERS2004 dataset includes the main, cross-section survey, as well as a small time-
series dataset for a subset of questions and rms that have been linked with previous surveys.
We employ the larger, representative cross-sectional dataset: this contains more information
relevant for our purpose. The cross-section WERS2004 includes a Survey of Employees, a
Survey of Management, and a Survey of Worker Representatives. We mainly rely on the
information in the Management Questionnaire (MQ). For part of our analysis, we link the
MQ and the Survey of Employees (SE), for which 25 employees from each rm were randomly
chosen to respond to a short questionnaire (all employees were surveyed in rms with fewer
than 25 workers). Employees from all 2295 rms included in the cross-section survey were
asked to ll out the questionnaire.
3.2 Union size and industrial actions
For our analysis, we are most interested in the information on union membership at a work-
place and in the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions. According to the theoretical
model, the increasing size of the bargaining unit or union size reduces the probability of be-
ing decisive and increases the emphasis on expressiveness, and is therefore a proxy for the
expressiveness of employees.
For union membership, we rely on the question in the MQ which asks How many em-
ployees at this establishment are members of a trade union or independent sta¤ association
- whether recognized by management or not?We construct two di¤erent measures of union
size based on this question. First, we relate the information to the data on total employees
to get a measure in percent (from 0 to 100) of relative union size within each rm (union size
in percent). This is the commonly used proxy for union size in the literature. Moreover, in
the theoretical model, union size varies while rm size remains xed: as this is not true in
our multi-rm empirical setting, we believe that dividing the number of union members by
total employees in each rm is a reasonable proxy for union size in our context. However,
we also use the absolute size of union or sta¤ association membership (absolute union size)
to test the robustness of our predictions.10 This proxy reects the models focus on absolute
union membership, though it doesnt consider varying rm size. This second measure adds
to the literature on union size e¤ects as this is the rst time, to our knowledge, that absolute
numbers are used.
Unfortunately, the question above also includes non-union sta¤ organizations,11 which is
10We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
11The WRQ has a similar question (wbpropme), which however only considers membership in the largest
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likely to slightly inate the membership numbers. We also acknowledge that union size may be
endogenous. For example, there could be a reverse causality e¤ect. A rm which has witnessed
some form of industrial action in the past may not be willing to recognise unionisation, though
employeeslegal right to unionise in the UK, together with the wording of the survey question
to include both recognised and un-recognised sta¤ associations, should limit the importance of
this e¤ect. An instrumental variables approach could potentially address both measurement
error and endogeneity issues, but we do not know of any instrument for union size in our cross-
sectional context.12 Our ndings are therefore limited to correlations, without any claim of
causality.
We have two possible measures of industrial actions: strike is a zero-one dummy for
whether or not a rm witnessed strikes of less than one day to a week or more; the dummy
variable for industrial action (indaction) is more general and includes not only strikes, but also
overtime bans or restrictions by employees; work to rule; lock outs; go slow; backing of work;
work-ins and sit-ins; and other, non-specied actions. The information in the WERS 2004
relates to all industrial actions that occurred during the 12 months preceding the interview
(question gactioin the MQ).
[Table 1]
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Table
2 gives the weighted proportions (in percent) of strikes and more general industrial actions
by rm size and by private and public sector (the majority of rms around 87 percent 
in the sample come from the private sector). Table 2 shows that the smallest-sized rms
with less than ten employees had no incidence of strikes in the 12 months preceding the
interview, although they did witness other forms of industrial action. Strikes are less frequent
than industrial actions in general, and both strikes in particular and all industrial actions in
general are found less frequently in the private than in the public sector.
[Table 2]
All types of industrial action clearly remain rare events in both private and public sector
and in rms of all sizes, with only around two percent of the rms having witnessed any
industrial action over the previous year. This low incidence of industrial actions revealed by
the survey is in line with a more general trend towards less industrial action that started in
union, disregarding possible smaller unions present in a rm. In addition, using the WRQ information sub-
stantially reduces the sample size. Results are similar, though statistically weaker (available upon request).
12Askildsen and Nilsen (2002) use an instrumental variables (IV) approach with a panel dataset to estimate
the e¤ect of unionisation on wages, employing lagged values as instruments. They nd that the coe¢ cient on
union size in fact tends to be even larger in the IV estimations with respect to the estimation results without
an IV approach.
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the 1980s. Both the number of strikes and other forms of industrial action, as well as trade
union ballots, have been going down, though the incidence varies across industries and regions
in the UK, and there have been several short-lived positive peaks in labour disputes (i.e., in
1996, 2002 and 2007). The year 2004 however did not prove to be exceptional, but rather
conrmed the decline: it had the lowest number of stoppages (130) on record at the time,
though 2005 and 2009 have seen even fewer stoppages, with 116 and 98, respectively. The
total of working days lost to strikes in 2004 (905 000) was however above the 1990s average
of 660 000, but still considerably lower than the averages for the 1980s (7.2 million) and the
1970s (12.9 million) (Hale, 2010).
This observation of a decreasing trend in industrial actions is echoed in the trade union
membership numbers. Union membership in the United Kingdom peaked in 1979 and has been
on the decline ever since, though the tendency has been less severe since the mid-1990s and
varies between industries and genders (note that trade union membership among women has
been increasing and recently surpassed male membership numbers). Between 2000 and 2010,
trade union membership decreased by around 3 percent in England, Scotland and Northern
Ireland, and by 5 percent in Wales (Achur, 2010).
3.3 Empirical methodology and results
Question 1. The rst theoretical point to be explored is whether larger unions, i.e., work-
places with a larger union membership among their employees and therefore higher expres-
siveness, are able to generate higher wages for union members. Unfortunately, the WERS
2004 does not provide detailed wage data for all employees, but only for the 25 (or less) em-
ployees surveyed in the SE in the form of weekly wage brackets.13 We link the SE to the MQ,
take the mid-point of the weekly wage brackets, and aggregate the information from separate
employee questionnaires from one single rm to arrive at two di¤erent rm-level average wage
measures: the mean and median weekly wages within each rm. We show results from OLS
regressions for both dependent variables according to the following model:
Wi =   unionsizei +   Vi + i; (21)
where Wi indicates the (natural logarithm of) average (i.e., mean or median) weekly wages in
rm i. As described above, we construct two variables for union size one in percent and one in
absolute terms based on information in the MQ. Vi is a vector of control variables. The rst
set of controls includes rm characteristics such as Standard Industrial Classication (SIC,
2003) and rm size dummies,14 the share of women in the total workforce (percent women),
13The weekly wage brackets are as follows: £ 50 or less; £ 51-£ 80; £ 81-£ 110; £ 111-£ 140: £ 141-£ 180; £ 181-
£ 220; £ 221-£ 260; £ 261-£ 310; £ 311-£ 360; £ 361-£ 430; £ 431-£ 540; £ 541-£ 680; £ 681-£ 870; and £ 871 or more.
14Firm sizes range from 5-9 employees; 10-24; 25-49; 50-99; 100-199; 200-499; 500-999; 1000-1999; and 2000
and over. The SIC 2003 codes include Manufacturing (D); Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E); Construction
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and the share of managers and senior o¢ cials (percent managers) as a rough proxy for the
number of the most highly-qualied and likely most highly-paid workers. We also include
the share of employees made redundant during the past 12 months (redundancies), which
points towards possible (nancial) di¢ culties the rm may be undergoing and the tensions
these may cause among employees. Such di¢ culties may negatively a¤ect the average wage
levels. We also add dummy variables for private sector (private sector) and stock-market
listing (listed).  is the error term.
The main results, using the relative measure of union size, are shown in Table 3. Both
measures of average wages have the expected positive relationship with union size, with the
association being particularly robust for median wages (Panel B). As relative union size goes
up, the average wage in a rm increases, as well. The economic impact uctuates from
relatively large when we consider the parsimonious specications in column (1), to relatively
small: the beta coe¢ cients for an increase of one standard deviation in union size (around
33.7 percent) on mean wages lie between 0.07 and 0.22.15 For median wages, they range from
0.06 to 0.19.16
[Table 3]
Looking at the control variables in Table 3, a higher percentage of managers in the total
workforce is associated with higher average weekly wages, while a higher percentage of women
is linked to lower average wages. Both ndings are highly signicant and consistent with
expectations. Interestingly, a large number of redundancies over the previous 12 months is
robustly associated with higher rather than lower average wages, while private sector rms
and those with a stock-market listing tend to have lower average wages.
These rst results support the theoretical prediction of a positive link between union size
and wages. Based on the model above, we argue that at least part of this relationship is
due to the e¤ect of expressive behaviour, and not only to the traditional union (bargaining)
power e¤ect. However, we acknowledge that it is di¢ cult to exclude the latter e¤ect given
the analogous measures of union size used in that literature. Table 4 therefore provides a
robustness test using absolute union membership data. Results are similar to Table 3 in the
rst three columns: though the positive link between absolute union size and mean wages is
less signicant in Panel A, Panel B shows more encouraging ndings for median wages, with
the coe¢ cient on absolute union size being positive and highly signicant.
(F); Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal and Household Goods
(G); Hotels and Restaurants (H); Transport, Storage and Communication (I); Financial Intermediation (J);
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities (K); Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social
Security (L); Education (M); Health and Social Work (N), and Other Community, Social and Personal Service
Activities (O).
15Calculated from (33:7  0:001)=0:46 and (33:7  0:003)=0:46, respectively.
16Calculated from (33:7  0:001)=0:52 and (33:7  0:003)=0:52, respectively.
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[Table 4]
In column 4, however, the relationship becomes negative with both wage measures, and
even signicantly negative for the case of mean wages in Panel A. Why should this be so?
The results appear not to be robust to the inclusion of controls for private sector and stock-
market listing. In fact, some further investigation shows that this puzzling nding originates
in industry-specic e¤ects. In column 5, we show the results excluding industry dummies and
including only rm size dummies. The theoretical model predicts positive union size e¤ects
given rm size, and these are conrmed. The results suggest, however, that industry-specic
idiosyncrasies can bias the e¤ect in the opposite direction.
Question 2. The second point regards the theoretical prediction that larger unions (and
therefore potentially greater expressiveness among union members) will be associated with
more strikes and other forms of industrial actions. In the absence of the standard source
of asymmetric information (namely regarding rm protability), we would not expect union
size our measure for expressiveness to be linked to the incidence of industrial actions. If,
however, union size is signicantly related to the incidence of strikes and general industrial
actions even once we control for the standard type of asymmetric information, then we would
have evidence that expressiveness matters.
To test the second question, we rely on the information provided by the MQ. Table 5 shows
a comparison in the mean union size using both measures for rms by type of industrial
action. We note a remarkably clear di¤erence: the mean union size is indeed signicantly
larger both in rms that have witnessed strikes and in rms that have seen industrial actions
in general during the previous twelve months. In rms that have seen a strike, relative union
size is more than ve times larger than in rms that have not seen any strike, while there is a
ten-fold di¤erence in absolute union size. Relative union size in rms that have experienced
any type of industrial action is around four times larger, while absolute union size is over
seven times larger.
[Table 5]
In order to further investigate this point and control for other possible causes of industrial
action, we perform logit estimations according to the following model:
Yi =   unionsizei +  Xi + i; (22)
where Yi is either strike or general industrial action in rm i. union size is again the propor-
tion or alternatively the absolute size of union membership among the rms employees
as described above, and Xi is a vector of control variables, including several variables conven-
tionally used in the strike literature. These can be divided into three categories: workplace
characteristics, measures of asymmetric information, and information on previous industrial
disputes.
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In the rst category we have a dummy variable for whether a rm is formally private
or public; the proportion of women in the total workforce; and controls for rm size and
industrial sector (SIC, 2003) of the rm. The second category includes several variables that
aim to control for the possible impact of asymmetric information on the protability of a
rm; this is the alternative explanation to the one proposed in the present paper for the
incidence of strikes and other forms of industrial action. These variables include a dummy for
whether a rm is part of a larger organisation with several plants in Great Britain (multiplant),
under the commonly made assumption that multi-plant organisations have less information
exchange than organisations with only one plant (see e.g., Godard, 1992; Ingram et al.,
1993). We also include a dummy variable for whether a rm is listed on a stock exchange,
following the reasoning that listed companies are required to publish more information on
their nancial situation and should therefore be less likely to see industrial actions; and,
nally, a dummy for whether senior managers meet with the entire workforce, for example to
communicate workplace changes (meetings), which takes advantage of the rich dataset we are
using and provides an interesting further test of the asymmetric-information hypothesis. The
third category on information on previous disputes includes a dummy for whether the rm
witnessed any collective disputes over pay or conditions with any group of workers during
the previous year (collective disputes); a dummy for signicant disruptions su¤ered because
of industrial actions in another organisation (i.e., a contagion e¤ect termed disruptions); and
the share of employees made redundant during the past 12 months (redundancies). i is the
error term.
The main results for the relative union size measure are shown in Table 6. The rst and
most striking nding from columns 1 and 3-6 is that union size is positively and signicantly
related to both the likelihood of observing a strike (Panel A) and of witnessing any type of
industrial action (Panel B). This conrms the results from the simple means comparison in
Table 5. It is a remarkable nding in light of the fact that we control for the conventional
asymmetric-information explanation of industrial actions in columns 3-6. In economic terms,
a one unit (i.e., one percentage point) increase in union size is associated with an increase
in the odds of witnessing a strike by a factor of 1.042, and in the odds of seeing any type
of industrial action by a factor of 1.031 (from column (1)). In terms of marginal e¤ects, the
mean predicted probability of a strike if ten percent of the workforce is unionised is 0.003 and
steadily increases to 0.105 if all employees are union members (taking the base estimation in
column (1), Panel A as a starting point). For all types of industrial actions, the probabilities
are 0.011 for a ten-percent workforce unionisation, and 0.142 for a 100-percent unionisation
(from column (1) in Panel B).
[Table 6]
Most interestingly, our proxies for the asymmetric information hypothesis suggest that this
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conventional explanation still holds, but that it coexists with the expressive behaviour-based
hypothesis proposed in the present paper. First, in column 2 of Table 6 we test whether our
proxies for asymmetric information have the expected e¤ects without adding our expressive-
ness measure. This is conrmed for two out of the three variables: our dummy for workplace
meetings is clearly insignicant and even has the wrong sign in Panel A (though it has the
predicted negative link with strikes and industrial actions in all other columns). We see that
rms that are listed on a stock market tend to witness fewer strikes and less industrial action
in general. And being part of an organisation with multiple plants is linked to more strike
activity and industrial action in general, which conrms the ndings of previous literature. In
short, these results conrm the expectation that better information ows reduce the incidence
of strikes and other industrial actions. Importantly, however, including both relative union
size and asymmetric information in columns 3-6 clearly shows that asymmetric information
does not a¤ect the impact of our expressiveness proxy. Instead, we see that the magnitude of
the coe¢ cient for multiplant rms is drastically reduced, and both stock-market listing and
the multiplant dummy are not as robust as our expressiveness proxy to the inclusion of more
control variables. This lends support to the idea that the conventional story of asymmet-
ric information is not the sole explanation for the occurrence of industrial action, and that
expressive behaviour is also a relevant and complementary explanatory factor.
Regarding the other control variables in Table 6, a higher percentage of women in the
workforce and being in the private sector are both less likely to be associated with any form
of industrial action, though the e¤ect is not signicant. A recent history of collective disputes
and work disruptions in other nearby organisations tend to coincide with a large increase
in the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions in a rm, while a large number of
redundancies has a weak negative link with strikes, but a highly signicant positive link with
industrial action in general.
Results from robustness tests using the alternative, absolute measure of union size are
shown in Table 7. The main ndings from Table 6 are largely conrmed using absolute union
membership, with the exception of the nal column 5 where we control for rm size. In
these last specications, absolute union size is still positively linked to the incidence of strikes
(Panel A) and all industrial actions (Panel B), but signicance drops below conventional levels
(p-values of 0.25 and 0.16, respectively).
[Table 7]
In summary, the empirical ndings support the main predictions from the theoretical
model: most importantly, they show that expressive behaviour, captured by union size, can
help explain the incidence of strikes and all industrial actions, even when we consider the
inuence of other possible factors such as asymmetric information on the protability of the
rm.
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4 Discussion and conclusions
The study of strikes has been a classical topic in labour economics. Recently however, interest
in the research area has waned, on the one hand because asymmetric information theory
appeared to o¤er a compelling explanation for strike incidence, and on the other because the
number of strikes and industrial actions in general has been on a downward trend for the
past two to three decades, at least in the UK and the United States. We contend that strikes
and other forms of industrial action are still important, albeit rare, occurrences, and draw
on developments in behavioural and political economics to o¤er an explanation of why they
occur that expands signicantly on Glazers (1992) study of strikes. They can be interpreted
as a manifestation of expressive behaviour where a foundation for expressive behaviour can
be located in fairness concerns. We argue both theoretically and empirically that a union
member may gain a non-instrumental, expressive benet from voting for a strike, and that
this benet becomes more important the larger the union (i.e., the voting group) and therefore
the smaller the probability of a single vote being decisive. We argue that expressive behaviour
is not an alternative explanation for why strikes occur, to the exclusion of the standard
theory of asymmetric information: the two approaches are rather complementary. In our
argument, asymmetric information also lies at the root of the explanation. However, instead
of workers being uninformed and the employers informed about prot levels, now the workers
are informed and the employer is uninformed about the degree to which the workforce is
expressive. We believe that this nding o¤ers an interesting new twist to explaining the
phenomenon of industrial action, which  in the current di¢ cult economic environment in
many industrialised countries is far from being an issue of the past.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
strike 2295 0.045 0.207 0 1
indaction 2295 0.067 0.249 0 1
union size, percent 2160 27.448 32.982 0 100
union size, absolute 2160 157.838 478.323 0 5657
percent managers 2279 10.786 11.653 0 100
percent women 2285 50.980 29.369 0 100
private sector 2295 0.743 0.437 0 1
listed 2295 0.197 0.398 0 1
multiplant 2295 0.752 0.432 0 1
meetings 2294 0.772 0.42 0 1
collective disputes 2291 0.098 0.297 0 1
disruptions 2294 0.041 0.199 0 1
redundancies 2164 1.553 5.775 0 84.344
lnmeanwage 22449 5.785 0 .459 3.219 6.857
lnmedianwage 22449 5.69 0.525 3.219 6.856
Notes : Descriptive statistics for mean and median wages refer to a di¤erent dataset from the other variables
(see text for details).
Table 2: Weighted proportions of strikes and general industrial actions by rm size and sector
strike industrial action









rm type private 0.2088 1.054
public 6.073 8.418
total percent 0.972 2.013
obs 2295 2295
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Table 3: OLS estimations of union size (percent) and average weekly wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage
union size, percent 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.0002
(18.85)*** (6.09)*** (6.21)*** (1.18)
percent managers 0.008 0.008 0.008
(14.73)*** (14.33)*** (14.47)***








Constant 5.537 5.783 5.774 5.946
(687.78)*** (256.22)*** (253.21)*** (187.78)***
R-squared 0.03 0.48 0.48 0.48
Panel B lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage
union size, percent 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(17.90)*** (9.37)*** (9.60)*** (4.38)***
percent managers 0.009 0.009 0.009
(15.49)*** (15.11)*** (15.43)***








Constant 5.422 5.726 5.707 5.897
(589.92)*** (223.17)*** (218.97)*** (163.24)***
R-squared 0.03 0.45 0.45 0.46
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no yes yes yes
Observations 21,102 21,021 20,009 20,009
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4: OLS estimations of (absolute) union size and average weekly wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage lnmeanwage
union size, absolute 0.001 0.00002 0.00003 -0.0001 0.00002
(28.54)*** (0.764) (1.468) (-2.904)*** (0.970)
percent managers 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011
(14.43)*** (14.01)*** (14.45)*** (18.39)***
percent women -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(-31.13)*** (-30.88)*** (-31.32)*** (-38.39)***
redundancies 0.006 0.006 0.007
(7.195)*** (7.313)*** (8.009)***




Constant 5.585 5.800 5.793 5.962 5.962
(912.6)*** (262.2)*** (259.5)*** (223.7)*** (222.9)***
R-squared 0.009 0.474 0.473 0.481 0.317
Panel B lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage lnmedianwage
union size, absolute 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00001 0.0001
(28.36)*** (3.664)*** (4.354)*** (-0.576) (3.934)***
percent managers 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.012
(14.83)*** (14.41)*** (15.14)*** (18.95)***
percent women -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008
(-32.54)*** (-32.00)*** (-32.60)*** (-40.90)***
redundancies 0.008 0.008 0.009
(9.890)*** (10.33)*** (9.892)***




Constant 5.476 5.758 5.742 5.958 5.948
(773.4)*** (229.4)*** (225.3)*** (195.8)*** (193.4)***
R-squared 0.008 0.446 0.446 0.458 0.319
SIC 2003 dummies no yes yes yes no
Firm size dummies no yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,102 21,021 20,009 20,009 20,009
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Mean estimates of union size and type of industrial action
union size union size
percent absolute
strike 71.426 76.502
no strike 13.909 7.227
di¤erence 57.517*** 69.275***
industrial action 54.323 54.404
no industrial action 13.642 6.936
di¤erence 40.681*** 47.468***
Notes : 2160 observations. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Logit estimations of union size (percent) and type of industrial action
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A strike strike strike strike strike strike
union size, percent 1.042 1.039 1.024 1.022 1.024
(7.132)*** (5.970)*** (2.215)** (1.692)* (1.725)*
percent women 0.993 1.007 1.006
(-0.839) (0.733) (0.637)
private sector 0.586 0.817 0.973
(-0.519) (-0.183) (-0.0233)
listed 0.161 0.143 1.185 1.129 1.247
(-2.211)** (-2.218)** (0.136) (0.0993) (0.222)
multiplant 22.65 8.071 6.833 6.180 4.136
(6.562)*** (3.433)*** (2.666)*** (1.986)** (1.635)
meetings 1.266 0.950 0.760 0.786 0.616
(0.481) (-0.094) (-0.441) (-0.303) (-0.774)






Constant 0.002 0.001 0.0004 0.00003 0.00002 0
(-14.78)*** (-13.56)*** (-12.93)*** (-6.853)*** (-7.366)*** (-11.07)***
Panel B indaction indaction indaction indaction indaction indaction
union size, percent 1.031 1.028 1.021 1.017 1.017
(6.496)*** (5.500)*** (2.748)*** (1.903)* (1.758)*
percent women 0.985 0.993 0.997
(-1.400) (-0.597) (-0.270)
private sector 0.760 0.788 0.954
(-0.386) (-0.296) (-0.0570)
listed 0.198 0.182 0.314 0.179 0.176
(-2.908)*** (-2.932)*** (-1.290) (-2.215)** (-2.205)**
multiplant 9.777 5.045 6.595 7.572 6.633
(2.997)*** (2.032)** (2.576)** (4.210)*** (3.613)***
meetings 0.728 0.591 0.543 0.738 0.654
(-0.648) (-1.003) (-0.951) (-0.516) (-0.884)






Constant 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.01 0.002 0.001
(-14.09)*** (-5.932)*** (-6.064)*** (-4.369)*** (-5.008)*** (-4.946)***
SIC 2003 dummies no no no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no no no no no yes
Observations 2,160 2,294 2,159 2,151 2,044 2,044
Notes : Odds ratios for logistic regressions shown. Values below one denote a negative impact on the probability
of witnessing a strike or general industrial action, while values above one denote a positive impact. t-statistics
in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Logit estimations of (absolute) union size and type of industrial action
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A strike strike strike strike strike
union size, absolute 1.003 1.003 1.001 1.002 1.001
(6.569)*** (6.455)*** (4.617)*** (4.376)*** (1.156)
percent women 0.989 0.999 1.001
(-1.264) (-0.0503) (0.106)
private 0.209 0.310 0.428
(-1.827)* (-1.486) (-0.959)
listed 0.160 1.146 0.972 1.026
(-2.150)** (0.111) (-0.0242) (0.0275)
multiplant 29.86 12.54 16.16 6.290
(6.014)*** (3.775)*** (3.054)*** (2.219)**
meetings 1.277 0.772 0.773 0.624
(0.484) (-0.427) (-0.332) (-0.774)






Constant 0.01 0.001 0.0001 2.11e-05 0
(-22.02)*** (-12.27)*** (-6.889)*** (-6.894)*** (-14.20)***
Panel B indaction indaction indaction indaction indaction
union size, absolute 1.003 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.001
(5.523)*** (5.226)*** (4.513)*** (3.566)*** (1.404)
percent women 0.982 0.991 0.994
(-1.629) (-0.809) (-0.515)
private 0.282 0.364 0.434
(-2.245)** (-1.579) (-1.350)
listed 0.195 0.437 0.165 0.174
(-2.843)*** (-1.106) (-2.142)** (-2.098)**
multiplant 10.18 8.664 11.43 8.914
(2.877)*** (2.925)*** (4.614)*** (3.717)***
meetings 0.724 0.549 0.645 0.590
(-0.647) (-0.980) (-0.719) (-1.045)






Constant 0.02 0.005 0.03 0.005 0.003
(-20.28)*** (-5.686)*** (-3.936)*** (-5.269)*** (-5.693)***
SIC 2003 dummies no no yes yes yes
Firm size dummies no no no no yes
Observations 2,160 2,159 2,151 2,044 2,044
Notes : Odds ratios for logistic regressions shown. Values below one denote a negative impact on the probability
of witnessing a strike or general industrial action, while values above one denote a positive impact. Constant
term included but not shown. t-statistics in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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